Using a newly available panel data on around ten thousand firms in Japanese manufacturing for the years 1994-2000, I provide some empirical support for the view that competition, as measured by lower level of industrial mark-ups, enhances productivity growth, controlling for R&D and other industrial characteristics. R&D competition, as measured by increased numbers of R&D doers, is also positively associated with a higher rate of productivity growth. Moreover, substantial part of productivity growth can be attributed to R&D. Market power, as measured by either market share or price-cost margin, has negative impact on productivity level for R&D performing firms.
I. Introduction
Does competition improve corporate performance? There is some theoretical basis that competition drives productivity improvements forward. But the empirical basis is not, as yet, strong enough. Although this general belief in the importance of competition is not fully supported by a series of solid empirical evidence in its favor, a feeling of the desirability of competition is quite strong in the policy arena ranging from deregulation, re-regulation to competition policy. By using a dynamic panel data model following Nickel (1996) , this paper analyzes the determinants of productivity in Japanese manufacturing industries, looking particularly at the impact of both product market competition and R&D competition on productivity 1 . In addition, I consider the impact of R&D stock on productivity using a standard production function framework initially formulated by Griliches (1979) .
In the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) tradition since the seminal work by Bain (1951 Bain ( , 1956 , there have been a lot of studies suggesting cross-sectional impact of market power on profitability which competition probably reduces. As mentioned by Nickel (1996, p.725) , however, this emphasis on profitability is rather curious, since the source of wealth of nation is the growth of productivity. Furthermore, a cross-section analysis is very tricky, because it is subject to various sources of misspecification due to simultaneity of R&D, heterogeneity and endogeneity of individual product prices, heterogeneity of the underling production functions, market turbulence effect (e.g. entry, exit, and mergers), and industrial characteristics such as demand growth and spillovers (Bresnahan 1989 , Schumalensee 1989 , Cohen and Levin 1989 , Griliches 1992 , Cohen 1995 .
I utilize an exceptionally valuable panel data at the firm level. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has conducted the comprehensive survey about real-world activities of Japanese firms -Basic Survey of Business Structure and Activities (BSBSA) -since 1991. The BSBSA has been conducted annually since the second survey in 1994, and I am able to examine firm level data consecutively since 1994 to the present. The BSBSA covers all the firms with no less than 50 employees or greater than 30 million yen capitalization in mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade. 2 The most valuable character of this survey is that it has been conducted by firm-unit of observation with a permanent identification code. Establishment data from Census of Manufacturers are also available in many countries, but price setting, investment, diversification, and R&D activities, to name but a few, are rarely determined by the unit of establishment as managerial decisions. In this respect, the BSBSA provides valuable information to accomplish empirical studies on firms' behaviors. The available dataset consists of an unbalanced panel with a large number of cross-section units of manufacturing firms (more than 13000 firms classified by 59 industry codes in manufacturing), each observed for a small number of time periods (for the years 1994-2000 at most). This situation is typical of micro panel data, and calls for an estimation method that does not require the time dimension to become large in order to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
In the analysis of micro panel data, assumptions about the properties of initial condition play an important role, because the influence of the initial observations on each subsequent observation cannot safely be ignored when the time dimension is short.
Identification then depends on limited serial correlation in the error term, which leads to use a convenient and widely used class of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators, i.e. the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model (Arellano and Bond 1991) . This estimator optimally exploits all the linear moment restrictions that follow from the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms. This method has been widely used in the empirical industrial organization literature (Geroski et al. 1993 (Geroski et al. , 1997 Nickel 1996; Nickel et al. 1997; Blundell et al. 1995 Blundell et al. , 1999 Klette 1999; Aghion et al. 2002) .
The empirical results reported here provide some support for the view that competition, as measured by lower level of industrial mark-up, enhances productivity growth, controlling for various firm specific and industry specific characteristics. R&D competition, as measured by increased numbers of R&D doers, is also associated with a higher rate of productivity growth.
In addition, substantial part of productivity growth can be attributed to R&D activity. Market power, as measured by either market share or price-cost margin, has negative impact on productivity level in R&D performing firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II gives a literature review concerning competition, R&D and productivity. Section III lays out empirical formulations.
Section IV explains variable construction and measurement issues. Section V presents empirical findings. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Literature

Theoretical Background
In the Schumpeterian tradition, key features of market structure which would determine innovation and productivity are firm size and market power. There is a broad range of both theoretical and empirical literatures on the relationship between competition and productivity 3 .
First, there have been a lot of studies in line with a neoclassical model of firms. If firms have market power, then their optimum size may differ from minimum cost position, and if economies of scale and/or scope exist, such differences may be more noticeable. Recent game-theoretic arguments have suggested that the degree to which costs are sunk and the resulting intensity of potential competition may be important determinants of firm size and market structure (Sutton 1991 (Sutton , 1998 .
Second, transaction cost economics and contract theory of firms provide various theoretical predictions. Holmstrom (1982) , Hart (1983) and Mayer and Vickers (1997) present models of managerial incentives that demonstrate explicitly how competition among firms may sharpen efficiency incentives. On the other hand, Martin (1993) provides a model in which competitive forces in the product market may raise the sensitivity of profits to the action of managers. He finds that increased competition tends to be negatively associated with managerial effort. Furthermore, financial pressure may play some role in motivating organizational efficiency and growth, as pointed out by Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 2000 , Nickel et al. (1997), and Aghion et al. (1999) 4 .
Third, endogenous growth theory (hereafter EGT) provides an alternative theoretical basis of the relationship between competition and productivity (Grossman and Helpman 1991 , Aghion and Howitt 1992 , Caballero and Jaffe 1993 , Jones 1995 , Aghion and Howitt 1998 , Aghion et al. 2001 . EGT generates various predictions as to the relationship between competition, innovation and productivity. For instance, Aghion et al. (2002) predicts theoretically and then examine empirically the relationship between product market competition and the number of successful patents. They find an inverted-U relationship between them as in line with earlier empirical findings by Scherer (1967) and Levin et al. (1985 Levin et al. ( , 1987 .
Fourth, there are a lot of attempts to identify life cycles of firms. Geroski (1999) describes the literature as stage theories of growth (Jovanovic 1982 , Hopenhayn 1993 , Klepper 1996 . Several case studies using relatively long time-series data provide appealing empirical findings which are consistent with some predictions of the theoretical models (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 , Pakes and Ericson 1998 , Klepper and Simon 2000 . However, as suggested by Geroski (1999) , this view that there is a secular (or long run) deterministic trend in the pattern of growth may be problematic, since most empirical findings suggest that a firm's growth rate displays a stochastic trend which are subject to Gibrat's Law, i.e. firm size evolves in an erratic and unpredictable manner over time (Sutton 1997 (Sutton , 1998 Geroski 1999; Goddard et al. 2002) . It seems to be a difficult task to accommodate the inconsistency between broad empirical findings of stochastic trend and the theoretical prediction of stage theories of growth by using the typical micro panel data with a small number of time periods.
Finally, there is a growing body of the literature concerning Penrosian models of organizational capabilities (Penrose 1959 , Slater 1980 , Clark and Fujimoto 1991 , Teece et al. 1997 , Dosi et al. 2000 . Penrose argued that firms had no deterministic long run optimum size, but only a constraint of managerial limit to growth on current growth rates. Furthermore, Penrose thought of firms as bundles of managerial resources which were bound together by a set of organizational capabilities. In the spirit of this theory, firms compete in constructing organizational capability (or core competence), rather than simply setting price or quantity.
R&D competition seems to be relevant to this view. Of course R&D is not the only method to build up organizational capability. There are a lot of other aspects of a firm's organizational capability, such as managerial skill, product market strategies, experiences (learning by doing or practiced routines), and IT investment.
Empirical Background
In general, productivity estimates would be biased upward by imperfect competition without careful treatment of endogeneity of market structure. It is almost impossible to negate that a lot of important manufacturing sectors are subject to imperfect competition (Hall 1988 , Bresnahan 1989 . Moreover, joint consideration of the impact of R&D and competition toward productivity needs additional care about the Schumpeterian dynamics in market structure, since innovation incentive depends not only on post-innovation rents, but also on the differences between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents (Arrow 1962 , Geroski 1995 , Geroski et al. 1997 , Hall 1999 , Aghion et al. 2002 . Competition may increase the incremental profit from innovation because it may reduce a firm's pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces its post-innovation rents. Competition thereby encourages R&D investments, which may lead to higher productivity growth.
There are several empirical studies which confirm competition effects on the level of productivity using a standard panel data model, such as Geroski (1990 Geroski ( , 1995 and Nickel et al. (1992) . On the other hand, Nickel (1996) , Geroski et al. (1997) , Nickel et al. (1997) , Blundell et al. (1995 Blundell et al. ( , 1999 , and Aghion et al. (2002) utilize dynamic panel data models, and suggest that market power reduce the growth of productivity and/or innovation. For example, Nickel (1996) presents evidence that competition, as measured by lower levels of rents, is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity in UK manufacturing.
Another type of important empirical studies is done by Caves et al. (1992) and Torii (2001) . They utilize a stochastic frontier production function model to estimate technical inefficiency using cross-section data and relate them to competition indicators with other variables of interest. The relevant finding is that an increase in market concentration above a certain threshold tends to reduce technical efficiency in several OECD countries.
These findings with positive correlation between competition and productivity growth appear to be consistent with the Darwinian view that competition is good for growth because it forces firms to innovate to survive (Porter 1990 ). However, entry, exit, and mergers are often neglected in the productivity literature 5 . In a recent careful study, Nishimura et al. (2003) shows that there are no evidence to demonstrate natural selection mechanism of economic Darwinism works even in severe recession periods in Japan. They explore a firm's entry, survival, and exit and its relationship with total factor productivity using the BSBSA data. Their empirical results
show that efficient firms in terms of total factor productivity quit while inefficient ones survived in the banking-crisis period 1996-1997. Their study strongly suggests that entry barriers to new competition due to a financial predicament as well as strict government regulations (especially in service sectors) are crucial determinants of productivity.
A new semi-parametric approach to market turbulence is presented by Olley and Pakes (1996) . They deal with both selectivity and simultaneity in an intertwined fashion. Their estimation procedure is as follows: the investment demand of the firm at time t can be written as a function of the predetermined capital stock variables and that part of the shock in the production function that is transmitted to both the employment and the investment decisions.
Inverting this relationship and solving for the shock as a function of investment and capital stock, one can approximate it semi-parametrically and estimate the production function in two steps. First one gets a consistent estimate of the coefficient by using the estimated labor coefficient to move the endogenous labor variable to the left-hand side of the equation.
Their method rests on two strong assumptions: (1) that there is only one single component unobservable in the system which follows a first-order Markov process and is fully transmitted to the investment equation, and (2) that no other variables or errors appear in it.
Their solution to the simultaneity problem is a smart way to exploit the fact that the unobserved productivity shocks are transmitted to more than one equation and should be estimated within a system of behavioral equations. I adopt another approach in the present study which leans more heavily on assumptions about lags in the transmission of the disturbances to the other decision variables and use lagged values as instrumental variables in estimating such models (see Blundell and Bond 1998) . Thus although I treat simultaneity biases and serial correlations explicitly, selectivity problem is still hardly avoidable in the present study. I will discuss this 5 The recent careful studies which treat market turbulence effect explicitly are, for example, Hopenhayn (1993) , Nishimura et al. (2003) , and Disney et al. (2003) .
issue further in later sections.
Concerning the relationship between product market competition and innovation, a standard industrial organization theory predicts that innovation should decline with competition, as more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful innovators (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, Aghion and Howitt 1992) 6 . A lot of empirical studies, however, show that there is a positive correlation between product market competition and innovative output (Geroski 1995; Blundell et al. 1995 Blundell et al. , 1999 Aghion et al. 2002) . In this respect, EGT successfully provides rich theoretical predictions, some of which are virtually consistent with prior empirical findings.
Overall, there is some theoretical basis for the belief that competition drives productivity improvements forward. Indeed, there have been several empirical studies which confirm competition effect on productivity. However, the empirical basis is not still strong enough. The impact of product market competition on productivity should be the main concern about competition policy, but there are few solid empirical studies, especially for the Japanese industries. On the other hand, there is a growing body of empirical studies showing that product market competition enhances R&D and innovation, which may lead to a higher rate of productivity growth.
III. Empirical Formulation
In an excellent study, Nickel (1996) suggests that market power reduce the productivity growth in manufacturing sectors in the UK. I utilize his econometric framework as a basic model with a slightly different specification. Furthermore, I expand the basic model with an additive term of R&D activity using the conventional specification of the productivity literature (Griliches 1979 (Griliches , 1986 . That is, I abandon the interesting detail of specific innovative events (such as inverted-U relationship, patenting, and introduction of new products) and concentrate instead on total output or total factor productivity as a function of R&D investments. All productivity growth is related to all expenditures on R&D, thereby it is possible to estimate statistically the part of productivity growth that can be attributed to R&D.
Following Griliches (1979 Griliches ( , 1986 and Nickel (1996) , I define a productivity equation utilizing a Cobb-Douglas production function as follows:
6 A recent game theoretic analysis by Vives (2004) shows that increasing the number of firms still tend to reduce R&D effort, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability increase R&D effort provided that the total market for varieties does not shrink. This indicates that it is an important role of innovation to expand the set of new products, which would change resulting market structure. See also Klette and Griliches (2000) which give an alternative explanation to new product innovation by using a quality ladder model. It is worth noting that the present formulation does not make any explicit assumption of profit maximization, reflecting various predictions of firms' behavior in the literature. Put it differently, the model allows for the possibility that inputs (especially knowledge stock) are not fully adjusted to their equilibrium values, but are considered quasi-fixed while the firm solves its short run profit maximization problem. As Griliches (1986, p.152) indicated, while it is likely that major divergences among firms in rate of return to R&D would be eliminated or reduced in the long run, the relevant runs can be quite long 8 . One could also argue that the econometric assumptions necessary to justify the use of this equation do not include perfect competition in output or factor markets, as pointed out by Hall and Mairesse (1995, p.269) .
To eliminate the firm fixed effects, I simply difference the production function to obtain, after rearrangement, The fact that the social returns to R&D exceed its private returns, mainly due to knowledge spillovers among firms, has a sound empirical basis. For example, see Griliches (1992) and Jones and Williams (1998) . 8 See also the following arguments by Griliches (1986, pp153) : a "somewhat different version of this argument would claim that the world is indeed in approximate equilibrium but that different firms face different opportunities for doing research." 9 According to the usual terminology of the dynamic panel data analysis, it series is endogenous if it is correlated with it and earlier shocks although it is uncorrelated with 1 and subsequent shocks. On the other hand, if it and it is also uncorrelated but still correlated with and earlier shocks, the variable series are called predetermined.
I estimate the model using orthogonality assumptions between it ε ∆ and the set of instruments :
where is a vector of instruments dated
. Instrumental variables estimators based on this fact is essentially a generalized method of moment estimators (GMM), making use of the moment restrictions generated by the serially uncorrelated errors (Arellano and Bond 1991) .
GMM provides the optimal way to combine the set of orthgonality conditions. The asymptotically efficient GMM estimator based on the set of moment conditions minimizes
by using the weight matrix
where is consistent estimate of the first-differenced residuals obtained from a preliminary consistent estimator, N is the total number of firms, and
. This is a two-step GMM estimator. Under homoskedasticity of the it ε disturbances, the particular structure of the first-differenced model implies that an asymptotically equivalent GMM estimator can be obtained through a one-step procedure, replacing the weight matrix to
where H is a square matrix with twos on the main diagonal, minus ones on the first off-diagonals and zeros otherwise (see Arellano and Bond 1991 in more detail) . This method crucially depends on the absence of serial correlation in it ε . Absence of serial correlation is assisted by the inclusion of dynamics in the form of a lagged dependent variable. I use serial correlation tests developed by Arellano and Bond (hereafter A-B test) , as well as a standard instrument validity test (i.e. Sargan test).
I will mainly report the one-step GMM estimators' results since the standard errors associated with the two-step estimators tends to be seriously downward biased, as noticed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This is because the dependence of the two-step weight matrix on estimated parameters makes the usual asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable for the two-step estimators Bond 1998, Bond 2002) .
Generally, estimators which rely on first-differencing or related transformations to eliminate unobserved fixed-effects, and then use lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments for subsequent first-differences, can be expected to perform poorly in situations where the series are close to being random walks, so that their first-differences are close to being innovations, and will not identify parameters of interest in some limiting cases (Blundell and Bond 1998) . As is explained in the literature survey section, firms' growth rate might be subject to Gibrat's Law, and more generally identification may be weak when the series are near unit root processes. Thus the A-B tests are crucial to examine whether estimates are spurious statistical artifacts or not.
An important implication of a standard fixed effect model is that in the cross-sectional dimension (between) differences in levels explain differences in levels, while in the time dimension (within) differences in growth rates explain differences in growth rate. It is worth noting that, in the context to the present model, the attempt to isolate the impact of competition on the level of productivity is essentially a search for a time-series effect. It is clear from the estimation equation that what is concerned is the impact of changes in the level of market power ( ) on changes in productivity. On the other hand, the impact of competition on productivity growth is represented by the cross-sectional correlation between industrial competition index ( ) and productivity growth. In other words, the coefficient of competition variables either represents growth effect (cross-section effect) or level effect (time-series effect), depending on the variable construction of the competitive measures. 
Real Output, Real Input of Labor and Capital
Variable definitions are summarized in Table 1 . Output is measured by deflated sales and input of labor is defined by the total number of employees. Since there is no accurate information on material or the number of hours worked in the dataset, I have to define value-added as follows:
sales -operating cost + wage + depreciation + interest payments. This raises the questions about the role of materials (especially energy) and about the impact of fluctuations in labor and capacity utilization and the possibility that ignoring these issues may bias our results.
These misspecifications are similar in the sense that they all imply the failure of the ordinary least-squares assumption of no correlation between the included factors and the disturbance in the production function, resulting in biases in our estimates of the elasticities of the included factors and elasticity of scale. The exclusion of materials as a factor in the production function (or not using value added but real sales to measure production) implies that the relevant estimates should all move up roughly in proportion to the elasticity of materials.
Thus ignoring materials assumes implicitly that materials are used in fixed proportion of output.
Put it differently, I assume here that materials are purchased optimally and that their price relative to the price of output remains roughly constant over firms and over time (Griliches and Mairesse 1984) .
Concerning capital stock, making consecutive time-series data from BSBSA is virtually impossible, because the BSBSA has considerable numbers of samples with null investment as well as the dataset is unbalanced. Thus a standard perpetual inventory method is not applicable here 11 . Therefore capital stock is represented by the book value of tangible fixed asset deflated by real price of capital goods. This misspecification would introduce substantial measurement errors, especially in capital and labor coefficients in regressions.
As is suggested by Nickel (1996, p738) , freely estimated on these parameters, the data tends to push the coefficients strongly toward diminishing returns, which is not unusual in a dynamic time-series context. Nickel indicates that this is because of inadequately controlled measurement error in labor and capital, strongly accentuated by differencing. Hence for the purposes of investigating total factor productivity effects, it is better to impose constant returns 12 .
The present specification attempts to alleviate the simultaneity bias in the determination of employment, capital and output by using lagged variables as instruments. Thus, although the coefficients of labor and capital are not the primary concern at the present study, the ultimate directions of biases are not known a priori.
Product Market Competition
Main indicator of product market competition is price-cost margin. The conventionally used measures are concentration ratio, Herfindahl index, and market share. However, these measures tend to be misleading because they neglect both potential and international competition.
Furthermore, they are crucially dependent on the definition of market boundary and possible market turbulence effect as depicted by Nishimura et al. (2003) .
Unfortunately, I cannot address the market turbulence effect fully due to data limitation. That is, to make a dynamic panel data model estimable and particularly to be testable for serial correlation, I have to eliminate those observations with the number of consecutive periods for which data are held is less than five years. Hence it is problematic to use the traditional market competition measures alone. Therefore, I explore the impact of competition on productivity growth by using price-cost margin as an alternative competition measure.
There are several prior studies applying this treatment. Boone (2000) provides a convincing argument that any parameter increase that would result in increasing the relative profit shares of firms would be a suitable measure of product market competition. Nickel (1996) defines a competitive measure by average rents normalized on value-added. Aghion et al. (2002) uses the Lerner Index which is defined by operating profit minus financial cost divided by sales. Klette (1999) shows that simultaneous estimation of price-cost margins, scale economies and productivity reveals statistically significant, but quite small margins between price and marginal costs in most manufacturing industries. That is, problems with market power and unexploited scale economies seem to be small on average across manufacturing. Furthermore, Nishimura et al. (1999) shows that there is a negative correlation between international competitiveness and markup. Its sensitivity is uniform within an industry though skewness may be problematic in estimation. Overall there is a sound theoretical basis and empirical support for price cost margin or other form of rents to use as a product market competition measure. and (ii) estimates of the competition index would suffer from endogeneity bias. The first point has been examined extensively in the industrial organization literature. Green and Porter (1984) show theoretically that markups will be pro-cyclical under imperfect information. On the other hand, Rotenberg and Saloner (1986) show markups will be counter-cyclical under perfect information. Both of the theoretical analyses assume implicit collusion among firms. As for empirical findings, Odagiri and Yamashita (1987) and Nishimura et al. (1999) find pro-cyclical mark-ups in Japanese manufacturing industries. Domowitz et al. (1986) , Machin and Van Reenen (1993) , Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) , and Ghosal (2000) also find similar pro-cyclicality in manufacturing industries in UK or US. Thus I include growth rates of both industrial sales and import penetration in regressions to control possible cyclicality of industrial demand.
Concerning the second issue, I treat the individual firm's price-cost margin or market share as endogenous. That is, the firm specific competition variable ( it s ∆ ) is expected to measure time-series competitive effect on productivity level. On the other hand, the industrial competition measure ( ) is assumed to be exogenous, and their identification comes from variation across industries over time. This means that, although is assumed to be time-invariant in the empirical formulation (and this is virtually in accordance with the actual data), there still remains some endogeneity bias. To alleviate possible endogeneity bias in the industrial competitive measure, I contain several cross-sectional control variables in regressions which will be explained below. Accordingly there would be some reservations about this crude variable formulation.
Nonetheless it is the first attempt, as far as I know, to measure R&D competition directly in the cross-industry productivity literature.
R&D Stock
The effect of R&D stock is measured by γ that is allowed to vary across firms. Estimation of γ would require data on the growth of R&D stock. But if investment in R&D does not depreciate, then data on R&D intensity can be used to capture the R&D effect. That is,
where ρ is the marginal product of R&D, is output, Y R is R&D expenditures, and K is R&D stock. This implies that the rate of growth in productivity depends on the intensity of R&D investment (Griliches 1986 (Griliches , 1998 16 . Thus the impact of R&D intensity on productivity growth can be regarded as time-series effects, i.e. the 15 Theoretically, R&D competition may either enhance or reduce R&D incentive. Spillovers may have some key role in determining productivity growth (Spence 1984 , Goto and Suzuki 1989 , Griliches 1992 , Jones and Williams 1998 . But it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine spillover effect explicitly. 16 If R&D investments depreciate, as they likely do, then the equation is subject to misspecification by leaving out a term of
where φ is depreciation. Since and are likely to be positively correlated, this omission may bias the estimated coefficient downward. However, this assumption of zero depreciation is somewhat standard in the productivity literature. Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) and Hall and Mairesse (1995) find that point estimates rise with the assumed rate of depreciation but that the specification's fit is best with zero rate of depreciation. Under perfect competition,
ρ could be also interpreted as the rate of return. impact of R&D stock on the level of productivity.
R&D would possibly enhance productivity (Griliches 1998) . However, almost the same caveats to R&D competition are applied in exploring the relationship between R&D and productivity as suggested before. For example, there would be sample selection biases (a lot of zero-reporting firms in R&D as is emphasized by Griliches 1994), long gestation lag in R&D activity, the role of public research (spillovers) etc. In the following econometric analyses, I employ regressions by using separate samples of R&D performers and non-performers, but sample selection bias may still affect the estimates. Furthermore, a large portion of R&D is personnel cost, and tacit knowledge would be accumulated as human capital within a firm.
R&D stock bears thereby a considerable adjustment cost. Hence I treat R&D stock as an endogenous variable in regressions.
Market Share and Diversity Index
Although market share is conventionally used as an index of market power, there are a lot of reservations to use (Nickel 1996, p.733 ): (i) collusion depends not only on the size of the various firms involved relative to the market but also on other factors that are hard to control;
(ii) potential as well as actual competition influences market power; (iii) market share does not fully reflect foreign competitors; (iv) market share uses industrial sales as the denominator, but it is not certain that this represents the actual market. Thus, the estimates of market share would have little value as a cross-section measure of market power. However, if the measure is used as a time-series measure, the problems above are less serious (Nickel 1996, pp.733-4) . The reason is as follows. There are two types of possible causality: (i) competition to firm growth and productivity growth; (ii) firm growth and productivity growth to competition. Reverse causality yields the opposite sign. Thus if there is a positive relationship between productivity growth and competition (or negative relationship between market share and productivity growth), I might argue that the true relationship is much stronger.
Furthermore, in order to alleviate the above mentioned issues, I define weighted average market share following Crépon et al. (1998) . By using their definition, it is also possible to define diversity index of firms. Let be the sales of firm for its product in the industry segment or market (time subscripts are suppressed), then 
Other Control Variables
I include additional control variables in regressions as shown in Table 1 . Although it is very difficult to incorporate a broad range of real business activities into a single empirical formulation, I attempt to trace not only R&D activity but also some other related aspects of industrial characteristics 18 .
First, to control market demand fluctuation, I include growth rates of both industrial sales and import penetration in regressions. These variables as well as year dummies are expected to control the cyclical components of price-cost margin.
Second, in order to control a firm specific appropriability condition which may affect individual firm's productivity, I also contain a technology trade variable ( ) in regressions which is defined by technology trade turnovers (revenue + expenditure) divided by sales. The sum of revenues and expenditures of the whole category of technology (patents, utilities, design, copyrights, trademarks, and know-how) are used in calculation. This variable is expected to condition appropriability of R&D in a comprehensive manner (Levin et al. 1987 , Cohen 1995 . That is, an active firm in technology transaction is able to retain more profit from R&D investment, thus such a firm would be more productive.
it trade tech _ Third, I contain debt-asset ratio in regressions as a financial constraint variable. As is well known, the macro economy since the latter half of 90s in Japan has been suffered from 17 The industry classification in manufacturing as well as the corresponding number of firms in both full sample and estimation sample is shown in Table A1 . 18 Some related data which would be expected to reflect organizational capabilities are actually collected in the BSBSA, such as the usage of IT technology between and within firms. But it is impossible to use these data consecutively and consistently at the present study since most of these questionnaires are conducted every three years and the questionnaires themselves have been significantly changed through the surveys.
severe financial predicament and debt-deflationary pressure. Note that diversity index, debt-asset ratio and technology trade are all included in levels. Hence these variables are expected to control the cross-sectional correlates of productivity growth. I also treat these variables as endogenous.
Data Issues and Selectivity Bias
To eliminate apparent outliers (due to missing data, erroneous data and possible erroneous matches) without using arbitrary imputation procedures, I computed the sales/asset ratio and eliminated those observations outside the 95 percentile (i.e. 2.5% on both side). I also eliminated those observations whose price-cost margins were more than unity. Using these procedures, the observations decreased by 5.05%. To make the dynamic panel data model estimable, I further eliminated those observations with the number of consecutive periods for which data were held was less than five years. By this procedure, the observations decreased by 27.40% (see Tables 2 and A) .
The summary statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . Number of observations and basic statistics of R&D performers and non-performers are shown in Table 2 . According to the Student's t-values, almost all key variables, such as sales growth rate, price-cost margin, debt-asset ratio and real value added per employee, are statistically different between R&D performers and non-performers. Employment adjustment rate is the sole variable which is not statistically different between the two sub-samples.
The sample selectivity problem may be quite serious for panel data. If observations are not missing at random, estimates that are based on cleaned sub-samples could be badly biased.
A negative correlation between estimated productivity shocks and future probabilities of exit would induce a negative correlation between an error term and the stock of capital among the surviving firms and bias the estimated capital coefficient downward in such sample. Moreover, sample selection bias due to zero-R&D reporting or less-R&D reporting is hardly avoidable.
The comparison between the full sample and the estimation sample in Table 2 suggests that firm size (permanent employee and real sales) in the estimation sample is slightly larger than in full sample, whereas sales growth rate in estimation sample is relatively lower than in full sample. This indicates that some new growing firms are omitted in our estimation sample, in other words, the coefficients of the competition measures would be underestimated due to sample selection bias. However, there are no significant differences in price-cost margin between the two samples. If I adopt price-cost margin as a competitive measure, I expect that the above mentioned sampling bias would be, at least partially, alleviated 19 . The present dataset from the BSBSA arguably covers smaller non-listed firms much more comprehensively than other firm-level data-source such as financial statements 20 . Hence I expect that this sort of selection bias would be less serious than the conventionally used firm level data set which contains listed companies alone.
V. Results
The results of the basic specification are presented in Table 4 . The dependent variable is log real sales. The number of consecutive periods for which data are held is at least five years. Since some observations for market share and price-cost margins are differently missing due to erroneous data and possible erroneous matches, the number of observations for market share is not necessarily identical with that for price-cost margin. Constant-returns-to-scale in labor and capital is imposed in all regressions. All equations are estimated in first differences and include both year dummies and industry dummies. To save space the coefficients of these dummies are omitted.
A-B test statistics that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 is zero are shown by the rows denoted by m 1 and m 2 respectively. The pattern of serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is consistent with the assumption that the it ε disturbances are serially uncorrelated, so that it ε ∆ should have significant negative first-order serial correlation but no significant second-order serial correlation. There is also some evidence that the AR(1) model is well specified for the data series as is shown by the significant coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. The estimates, however, are quite small and negative. This suggests that there may be some weak tendency to mean reversion which has been pointed out by the literature on Gibrat's Law in productivity growth (Sutton 1997) .
As the empirical model is over-identified, it is appropriate to use Sargan statistics to test the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Consistent with the evidence from the serial correlation tests, the null that these moment conditions are invalid is not rejected at any conventional significance level in columns (1) and (3). The Sargan statistic from the one-step homoskedastic estimator in column (2) marginally rejects the null that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. This could be due to heteroskedasticity. However, the two-step Sargan test may be better for inference on model specification. Sargan χ 2 (98) is 80.51 (p=0.901) in column (2) using two-step homoskedastic estimator. In addition, the two-step standard errors tend to be biased downward in small samples. For this reason, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend the in a different industrial sector from the previously classified one. Thus entry and exit through inter-industry move would cause possible another sampling bias. 20 The BSBSA is one of the government-specified statistics, which means that all the relevant respondents have legal obligations to respond to them, as is the case in the National Census. one-step results for statistical inferences. Thus I report the one-step results in column (2).
The estimation result in columns (1) In columns (2) and (3), the time-series measures of product market competition ( or ) have negative sign as expected but not statistically significant. These variables are entered in growth rate, thus there are no significant impact of competition on productivity level. This non-significance may be partly due to small within variation in the data with at most seven-year periods. It should be noted that several control variables have also significant coefficients. First, cyclical time-series factors such as industrial growth and import penetration are positive and significant. Unreported coefficients of either industry dummies or year dummies are also jointly significant respectively. Thus it is arguable that industrial demand fluctuation is well controlled in the basic specification. Second, debt asset ratio has significantly negative impact on productivity. Third, product diversity and technology trade has positive signs although statistical significances are quite weak.
Next, in order to see whether or not R&D affects productivity growth, I expand the basic specification to include R&D stock measures. Table 5 shows that the positive impact of R&D intensity (rd_intensity) on productivity growth is highly significant. If R&D intensity can be regarded as R&D stock measure as is explained before, substantial part of productivity growth can be attributable to R&D stock. The parameter estimates (0.48 to 0.61) are virtually comparable to but slightly higher than the estimates of the prior studies in Japan, such as Odagiri and Iwata (1986) and Goto and Suzuki (1989) . The possible reason for the higher estimates would be the omission of knowledge spillovers (Griliches 1992, Goto and Suzuki 1989) . The coefficients may be thereby over-estimated due to the omitted variable bias.
As for the remaining explanatory variables, I obtain virtually similar results to the 21 In unreported regressions, each variable is still strongly significant even if the other variable is dropped. 22 Aghion et al. (2002) found that the equilibrium degree of technological 'neck-and-neckness' among firms should decrease with product market competition. In Table 6 , I employ regressions by using separate samples of R&D performers and non-performers. R&D performers are defined as firms reporting non-zero R&D expenditures and non-performers reporting no R&D expenditures within observation periods. In this case, the time-series competition effect ( or ) has negative signs and is statistically significant for R&D performers, whereas they are not statistically significant for non-R&D performers. This suggests that market power, as measured by market share or by higher level of individual mark-up, has negative impact upon productivity level in R&D performing firms.
Industrial competitive effects are virtually preserved in Table 6 . Thus it is likely that industrial competitive effects have a robust cross-sectional impact on productivity growth. R&D intensity has still positive and significant effect on productivity level, but the coefficients (0.23 to 0.24) become slightly lower than the previous estimates. The possible reason would be the negligence of knowledge spillovers which causes the estimated coefficients downward biased. R&D performers would have better absorptive capacity and could obtain external knowledge more effectively than non-R&D-performers, as is suggested by Cohen and Levinthahl (1989) . But the magnitude of this effect is virtually comparable to the estimates of the previous studies such as Goto and Suzuki (1989) .
Other salient feature in the estimated results in Table 6 is as follows. First, the coefficients of debt-asset ratio are negative and still highly significant for non-R&D performers, but no longer significant for R&D performers. As is well known, in the latter half of 1990s, the Japanese economy suffered severe debt-deflationary pressure which possibly damaged the firms with stricter financial constraint. The estimates suggest that this financial predicament damaged more the non-R&D performers than the R&D-performers 23 .
Second, concerning the technology trade variable, Table 5 produces positive and significant result at the 5% significance level. In table 6, however, the tech_trade variable is not statistically significant for R&D performers, but slightly significant for non-R&D performers (at 5 to 10% significance level). The possible reasons for the differences between R&D performers and non-performers appear to be that (i) R&D performers may tend to appropriate their R&D outcome through in-house production; (ii) some industries with many non-R&D performers are likely to be doing relatively more informal R&D, reporting less of it, and hence providing the appearance of more productivity gain from technology transaction. Thereby the relevant R&D expenditure is measured with error due to less-reporting bias and the estimated coefficients for technological trade may be upward biased. Unfortunately this sort of bias is hardly avoidable.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Our findings strongly suggest that both product market competition and R&D competition enhance productivity growth (cross-section effect). R&D stock is also positively associated with productivity growth (cross-section effect). Market power may have some negative impact upon productivity level in R&D performing firms (time-series effect). Furthermore, debt-asset ratio has a negative impact on productivity growth in non-R&D performing firms. The empirical findings provided here are subject to a number of reservations. Nevertheless, they do raise the issue that suppressing competition may turn out to have been very costly to the economy in terms of foregone growth opportunities.
The present study opens up a number of questions for further study. First, the analysis should have controlled for product differentiation because most products in manufacturing consist of a number of different level of quality and varieties. However, empirically useful measures of product differentiation and appropriate deflators adjusted for quality are difficult to derive even in principle, not to mention the practical problems with data availability.
Second, I construct the R&D competition measure by using the R&D expenditures at the firm level. But firm-level R&D data may not be adequate enough for the purpose of investigating R&D competition, since some portion of manufacturing firms in Japan are integrated into interlocking groups 24 . Economies of scope and spillovers in R&D may have also caused possible estimation biases. Furthermore, R&D outsourcing and joint R&D cooperation is more noticeable in the late 90s in Japan. Ownership structure and R&D cooperation, especially in high-tech sectors, would be very important issues to explore the cause and effect of R&D competition in future research. Patent data would be a possibly beneficial source of information to investigate R&D competition, cooperation and spillovers (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002) .
Third, Griliches and his colleagues show that there are substantial heterogeneity and instability in the coefficients of the estimated Cobb-Douglas production function (Griliches 1998) . This indicates that a more flexible specification of technology would be desirable, as suggested by Klette (1999) and Nishimura et al. (1999) . The parameter estimates at the present study are still likely to be suffered from some instability, especially in the input coefficients of labor and capital. Furthermore, dynamic panel data models are in a developing area of research because in many cases GMM for panel data perform poorly in finite samples. I have used a 24 See Klette (1996) concerning scope economies, interlocking group and R&D performance.
large panel dataset and luckily obtained meaningful estimates, although the GMM on first differences still may produce imprecise estimates.
Finally, we should view this research as a small part of broader investigations in Japan.
Evidence from this paper may not be representative because the observation period is just for the years 1994-2000, which would be in some sense a distinctive period, in that many Japanese firms have been in the process of fundamental adjustment of over-capitalization under serious debt-deflationary pressure. Furthermore, detailed investigation of the individual industry and its comparison with industry aggregates is required before any strong conclusion could be drawn about the relationship between competition and productivity. 1) The dependent variable is log (real sales). The number of consecutive periods for which data are held is at least five years. Some observations for market share (share it ) and price-cost margin (pcm it ) are missing differently, therefore the number of observations using share as an independent variable is not identical with that using price cost margin (pcm it ). Constant returns constraint is imposed in all equations. All equations are estimated in first differences and include both year dummies and industry dummies, although comp jt , rd_herf jt , diversity it , debt_asset it , tech_trade it , and size it are all entered in level as control variables. Firm size is measured by permanent employees.
2) The equations are estimated using the dynamic panel data model based on Arellano and Bond (1991) . The GMM estimates reproted are one-step results. Asymptotic standard errors and p-values are reported in parentheses. m 1 and m 2 are Arellano-Bond tests that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 and 2 are zero, i.e., they are tests for the null on no first-order and second-order serial correlations, asymptotically N(0,1). Sargan statistics are used for testing of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically χ 2 . P -values are also reported. All computations are done using STATA.
3) * Variables are treated as endogenous.
4) † indicates that Sargan test from the one-step homoskedastic estimator in column (2) marginally rejects the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. This could be due to heteroskedasticity. 1) See footnotes of Table 4 . The GMM estimates reproted are one-step results in all equations.
2) * variables are treated as endogenous. 1) See footnote of Table 4 . The GMM estimates reproted are one-step results in all equations. R&D performers are defined as firms reporting nonzero R&D expenditures and non-performers reporting no R&D expenditures within observation periods. 
